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In
the ABC of the OPT, Orna Ben-Naftali, Michael Sfard and Hedi Viterbo offer a
guidebook for the legal tourist – a narrated cartography to the strange legal planet
that has become Israel/Palestine, governed by hundreds of military and civil officials
that harbor wide discretion and a flexible rule that I call phantom sovereignty.
Shaped as a lexicon, it includes entries that offer both a thematic and a chronological
history of what Ben-Naftali has previously called “the Israeli version of international
law”. It is also a guide to the relics and ruin of old colonial practices, and to the legal
and administrative legacies of old empires that have been adopted, innovated upon
and developed into international law, as well as into the Palestinian past and present
(see Stoler, Duress: Imperial durabilities in our times, 2016, 37-67).
Fleshing out the concepts, doctrines and toolkits of rule that make up the legal
terrain of the world’s longest remaining occupation, the format of the lexicon revives
the colonial and imperial phantoms that have created international law, and how
those legacies are used today by the Israeli state against the Palestinian population
in the occupied territories and beyond. Since one of the most powerful tools of
colonial rule has been the creation of colonial knowledge, and the transformation
of the world of the subjects through administrative, economic and physical means
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of violence, as well as international institutions (see Anghie, Colonialism and the
birth of international institutions, NYUJ Int’l L. & Pol. 34 (2001): 513), the use of the
lexicon seeks to cut through the colonial political grammar of the occupation. The
legal grammar of the occupation is usually boxed in within some complex mode of
analysis of asymmetric conflict; or the thin cobwebs of human rights law that look at
the occupation one violation at a time, essentially doing away with the larger political
context of the occupation – the partition plan, the war of independence and the
Nakba of 1948.
In this brief review, I will explore two aspects of the legal cartography offered in the
book in the entry on nomos and the entry on military courts. The entry on nomos,
authored by Orna Ben-Naftali, takes on a thematic thread of the entire book and
explains how Israel created an alternative legal universe of international law. The
entry on the military courts, written by Hedi Viterbo, looks at the institutions that have
intervened in the lives of most of the Palestinian population: Israel has arrested and
detained over three quarters of a million Palestinians. In 2018 alone, the military
arrested 6500 Palestinians, 1800 of whom were children.
Both entries demonstrate the ways in which sovereignty over Palestinians is
deployed by bureaucratic means, its weapons of procedural violence creating
thousands of mundane daily routines and decisions carried out by clerks, soldiers
and judges that remain unknown – Phantom sovereigns.
Ben-Naftali, in her entry on nomos, takes us on an exploratory journey to the
land where the Israeli version of international law rules. Like a dedicated guide,
she enters this terrain, which is the text of Judge Edmond Levy’s report, without
preliminary judgment, or disdain. She truly tries to speak the language of the strange
legal country that pops up with every page of the report. She does not, as some
liberal legal theorists would do, cling to the procedural flaws of the legal language
of the strange country, or to the broken way it uses international law. She does
not remain at the edges of the interpretation, threatened by the way it conjures
a semblance of law, devoid of its spirit. She is willing to look over the shoulder
of the bureaucrat, or the lawyer, as sociologist Max Weber suggests, in order to
understand the boundaries of their respective worlds.
The text she chooses to guide through and which “succinctly exempli#es the
Israeli nomos is contained in a report of an expert committee, established by the
Israeli prime minister […] to examine the legal status of Israeli construction in the
Judea and Samaria” (p. 278). This report concludes that from an international
legal perspective, the West Bank is not occupied territory; the law of belligerent
occupation is not applicable to the area; the “prevailing view” in international law is
that Jewish settlements are lawful; and that Israel has a valid claim to sovereignty
over the territory.
Ben-Naftali goes into the report, trying to understand what kind of world is created
by the Israeli understanding of international law that has been developed in the text.
Woven throughout the lexicon are possible explanations for the question how Israel
uses international law as a regime of justification. Regimes of justification, according
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to sociologist Luc Boltanski, explain the way people make moral and political sense
of their world and justify their particular actions and collective way of life.
Although the Levy committee report was to determine the status of the Israeli
settlements according to international law, it was actually a government response to
domestic pressures. On the one hand, pending petitions in the High Court of Justice
to demolish illegal outposts put forth by human rights organizations and Palestinian
residents of the occupied territories; and on the other, the demand from the Israeli
settler lobby for a legal basis for the settlements. While there is nothing new in the
understanding that domestic politics forge national interpretations of international
law, the Levy commission’s report brings the disparity between the norms that can
be agreed upon at the domestic level and the norms that can be agreed upon at the
international and transnational levels to a new benchmark. The disparity severs any
continuity of interpretation and reference between international law as understood by
the Israeli government and the rest of the legal world. The Levy committee decides
in its report that there exists no belligerent occupation – and if there is no occupation,
than the law of occupation does not apply. Moreover, most importantly for their
purposes, the very thing deemed illegal by the law of belligerent occupation, which is
settling the occupied area with the occupier’s population, is seen as not illegal at all.
Ben-Naftali goes on to show that since there is a rare consensus across the
globe that the Palestinian territories are occupied, and that settlements are
illegal according to the fourth Geneva Convention, and that there is a right to self
determination of Palestinians, the report intended to create a new legal nomos, in
which the area cannot be occupied because the Jewish people are exercising their
exclusive right to self determination and sovereignty based on the Bible and later
colonial documents.  The report supposes that the West Bank was Terra Nullius, and
empty land, whose people, the Palestinians have no right to self determination.
The peculiar way in which the Levy committee uses the long life of the occupation of
the OPT in order to legitimate its legalities is not original, but has roots with imperial
discourse concerning occupied populations. The committee concluded that Israeli
rule over the occupied territories through administration and law over time has laid
the groundwork for the very legality of Israeli control of the territory, because the
law of belligerent occupation can apply only to short-term occupations. Legalizing
occupation with its own duration is reminiscent of the response of the British colonial
government of India, when facing the Indian independence movement’s claim that
they must “quit India”. The British, in response, claimed that India was British by
law and had been for over a century. Alongside the temporal argument lies the
language of the mandate for Palestine, given to the British by the League of Nations
in 1922, that included the text of the 1917 Balfour declaration that Palestine was the
territory in which the Jewish national home was to be built. Ben-Naftali, in her entry
on nomos, writes on how international law becomes inseparable from the historical
ethno-national narrative. “That narrative unfolds a deep conviction in the exclusive
right of the Jewish people to sovereignty over the land of Mandatory Palestine. This
conviction – indeed, vision – informs its construction of international law. Transported
to the normative world, this vision posits a revision of international law.” (p. 283)
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Actually, the Levy committee does not engage with international law. It is almost
unconcerned by the community, legal technologies, text and mechanisms of power
that scholars, practitioners, politicians and the public call international law. Ben-
Naftali brilliantly shows how for decades, it was actually the mere utilization of the
framework of the law of belligerent occupation by the High Court of Justice that was
supposed to provide legitimacy for the military rule over the occupied territory. The
Levy committee’s narrative itself exposes the illegality of Israel’s occupation, for if
there is not a belligerent occupation, then the military commander has no authority
to rule, which means that all legal and administrative decisions taken by the military
apparatus of the occupation are illegal and were illegal retroactively. This illegality
is further advanced by the committee’s vision for international law Israeli style,
including an exclusive right to Jewish self-determination in the land of Israel, which
is based on British colonial documents: the Balfour declaration of 1917 and the
mandate for Palestine of 1922.
The Levy committee’s understanding of international law as enabling a racial
hierarchy of self-determination and sovereignty is frozen in imperial time, yet deeply
rooted in contemporary bureaucratic practices. Any and every critique of the Levy
committee and the settlement project based on international law are met with
domestic disdain. Ben-Naftali’s audience no longer inhabits the territory she writes
of.
The nomos in which there is no occupation shares the same cartography with
military courts, segregated physical spaces, with one gate opening to Israeli citizens,
mostly lawyers, and the other opening for Palestinians residents of the occupied
or unoccupied territories. In these mundane, bureaucratic courts, which are – as
Hedi Viterbo shows in his entry – anything but exceptional or extraordinary, the
product of the British colonial emergency defense regulations of 1945, there are
no citizens, only subjects. These are courts, run by the military prosecution, in
which thousands of cases are solved through plea bargains, usually after indictment
sheets are filled with 20 items, to be reduced to five and bargained upon, with not
a shred of evidence shown by anyone to any judge. The plea bargains are signed
because very few Palestinians accused in military courts are willing to take the risk
of chance and run the course of a trial. The footnotes of Viterbo’s entry on military
courts that describe the structure, procedures and decision-making practices of the
military courts tell the chilling story of one the most powerful institutions that govern
Palestinian life since 1967. In this brief entry, Viterbo focuses on the ways procedural
violence is employed in the military courts in the constant creation of uncertainty in
the legal process and in legal outcomes.
The institutional cartography of the military courts is based on a series of
contradictions between international law, military decrees and administrative
practice. I call the contradictions that allow for an extreme flexibility in the decision-
making of the colonial officials of the civil administration and the colonial judges of
the military courts the building blocks of phantom sovereignty, formed and shaped by
bureaucratic practice.
The nomos of the military courts, and the nomos of settlers in the view of the Levy
commission is created in and through daily practices and routines of a colonial
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bureaucracy whose operation is based on legal emergency and raison d’état, and
which adheres to a racial hierarchy that binds certain laws to specific populations.
These laws are entirely based on a series of exceptions – exceptions to a rule that is
never adhered to. A routinization of emergencies.
In many ways, Israel’s view of international law is precisely based on such
permanent exceptions to a series of rules that were never adhered to from the outset
of the occupation.
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